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until 22 June 1941, had to be shipped via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the final
analysis, Sander-Nagashima concludes,
naval cooperation between the two allies
was restricted to “the limitation of the
operational zones through 70 degrees
east longitude.”
Part III, written by Niestlé, a business-
man and author of numerous works on
German U-boats, details the meager lo-
gistical exchanges between Berlin and
Tokyo. In terms of passengers traveling
by transport ship, a mere twenty-one
people went from Europe to Japan, and
not quite nine hundred from the Far
East to Europe; by submarine, the totals
are ninety-six and eighty-nine, respec-
tively. In terms of material exchanges, in
1941–42 Japan shipped 104,233 tons to
Germany, of which 19,200 were lost; in
1942–43 half the 104,700 tons shipped
was lost. Of the goods shipped in both
directions by submarines, only between
20 and 40 percent ever arrived. While
the Germans were anxious for deliveries
of rubber and precious metals, the Japa-
nese requested industrial products, tech-
nical equipment, and chemical goods.
Part IV consists of a conclusion by
Sander-Nagashima.
My criticisms of this superb work are
but two. First, the fact that it has four
authors writing separate sections has re-
sulted in a good deal of overlap, retelling
various aspects of the story. Second, the
title does not do the book justice; it was
hardly a “reluctant” alliance but rather a
hollow, empty, or wasted one.
HOLGER H. HERWIG
University of Calgary
Herwig, Holger H., and David J. Bercuson. The
Destruction of the Bismarck. Overlook, N.Y.: Over-
look Press, 2001. 314pp. $35
Rhys-Jones, Graham. The Loss of the Bismarck: An
Avoidable Disaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2000. 272pp. $32.95
During the early evening hours of 22
May 1941, the German battleship Bis-
marck departed Bergen, Norway, to face
the might of the Royal Navy with only
the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in com-
pany. It was to be the battleship’s first
and only operational deployment. Five
days later, the ship went down with over
a thousand of its crew.
Considered then to be the world’s most
powerful battleship, Bismarck entered
the Atlantic when Britain was stretched
almost to the breaking point. With the
critical Battle of the Atlantic hanging in
the balance, the pursuit and sinking of
Bismarck was one of the war’s most dra-
matic episodes; many books and a movie
were dedicated to it. Those early works,
written mostly within twenty years after
the war, focused almost entirely on the
operation itself. None devoted attention
to the strategies, political aspects, or
operational and politico-strategic back-
grounds that shaped the battleship’s de-
ployment and the Allied responses to it.
That void has now been filled by the
two books under review, The Destruc-
tion of the Bismarck, by Holger Herwig
and David Bercuson, and The Loss of the
Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster, by Gra-
ham Rhys-Jones. Both books bring new
information and fresh perspectives to
the tale, putting Bismarck’s operation in
its strategic context. In doing so, the au-
thors highlight the strategic impact of
the potential outcomes of Operation
RHINE, the code name for Bismarck’s
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sortie. Perhaps more importantly, these
books expose the domestic political, the
operational, and the military-strategic
considerations that drove much of the
protagonists’ decision making. The books,
however, differ in their approaches.
Holger H. Herwig and David J. Bercuson
are prominent, widely published histori-
ans who coauthored an earlier book on
an Atlantic Ocean engagement in World
War II. Prior to their recent collabora-
tions, they had specialized in German
naval history and Canadian military his-
tory, respectively. Both live and teach in
Canada, and for the most part they write
from a western Atlantic perspective; as a
result they have incorporated U.S. plan-
ning and activities related to Bismarck’s
deployment and how U.S. naval opera-
tions affected the planning of the Ger-
man navy’s commander, Grand Admiral
Erich Raeder—a heretofore unexplored
topic. They also provide detailed, com-
prehensive treatment of the domestic
political considerations behind Raeder’s
thinking and the staff’s response to his
direction and requirements, recounting
the German naval staff’s extensive objec-
tions to Operation RHINE, its timing,
and the results of their predeployment
gaming of the operation. The book then
shifts to a lively but traditional narrative
of the battleship’s deployment and loss.
The Loss of the Bismarck takes a more
Euro-centric view of the battleship’s de-
ployment, focusing on the overall Anglo-
German strategic picture, with special
emphasis on Russia and the Mediterra-
nean. Moreover, it presents the pursuit
and engagement of Bismarck from a naval
command perspective, highlighting the
operational picture, available to the
commanders on both sides. The con-
tending naval doctrines and missions are
explained and provide context to the
decisions made and executed at the time.
The book reflects the background of its
author, Graham Rhys-Jones, a retired
Royal Navy officer whose career spanned
from ship’s operations to strategic naval
planning. He is not without academic
credentials, however, for he both at-
tended and taught at the U.S. Naval War
College. (See Graham Rhys-Jones’s “The
Loss of the Bismarck: Who Was to
Blame?” in the Winter 1992 issue of this
journal.) His combined academic, plan-
ning, and operational background en-
ables him to provide an operational
context for the battleship’s destruction.
More importantly, he demonstrates how
Germany’s and Britain’s lessons learned
in previous twentieth-century naval op-
erations shaped their actions in and re-
sponses to Operation RHINE.
The Loss of the Bismarck contends that
Admiral Raeder was a man totally
wedded to the idea of major surface
combatants operating as “raiders,”
attacking an enemy’s ocean commerce.
Raeder’s naval vision called for “surface
raiding groups” operating on the high
seas, powerful enough to overwhelm
most convoy escorts but fast enough to
escape fleet engagements. The two-ship
Bismarck class was to be Germany’s
initial post–World War I class of battle-
ships; the Bismarck and Tirpitz were
designed with the raiding mission in
mind. These ships were fast and
powerful and had a long cruising range
but were of a design that essentially rep-
resented an update of late World War I
practices. The never-built follow-on H
class was to have been the primary class
of German battleships, optimized for
raiding operations against the full range
of modern naval threats. Unfortunately
for Admiral Raeder, the war started too
soon for his dream battleships to be
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built, and the war’s early operations
found the much cheaper U-boats
enjoying far more success at commerce
raiding than his surface ships. He saw
the prospects for his “surface raiding
groups” retreating into the background.
This feeling was reinforced in 1941 by
the need to transfer nearly half of his
carefully husbanded fuel reserves to the
German army for the invasion of Yugo-
slavia and Greece and the planned
invasion of the Soviet Union, as well as
the sudden requirement to supply fuel to
the oil-starved Italian navy. His hopes
were revived, however, in late March
1941 when Vice Admiral Gunther
Lütjens returned from Operation
BERLIN, a surface-raiding sortie
involving the two battle cruisers Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau that destroyed over
115,000 tons of British shipping. Em-
boldened by Lütjens’s success and
believing that the future of his surface
ships was at stake, Raeder ordered an
almost immediate Bismarck deployment,
despite his staff’s and Lütjens’s objec-
tions and the lack of supporting forces.
From that point, Rhys-Jones depicts the
operational picture available to the re-
spective commanders, from Britain’s
Commander in Chief Home Fleet, Ad-
miral John Tovey, and Admiral Raeder
down their chains of command to the
commanders at the scene. What follows
is a chess game in which the reader sees
what the commanders saw, and (unlike
in previously published books) under-
stands why those commanders acted as
they did and how those actions affected
the overall operation. It is a revealing
and fascinating look into the fog of naval
war.
Thus the reasons for the decisions of
Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland aboard
HMS Hood become more apparent, as
do the tactical and operational impacts
of those decisions on the other players,
such as Admiral William Wake-Walker
aboard the cruiser HMS Norfolk, trailing
the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Britain’s
naval operations and heavy losses
around Crete, the German invasion of
which was under way concurrently with
Operation RHINE, were weighing heavily
on British commanders. They could not
afford a mistake in either the Mediterra-
nean or the Atlantic. German decision
making was hampered by inconsistent
and unintegrated intelligence support,
and it was inhibited by a complex naval
command structure in which Vice Ad-
miral Lütjens worked for no less than
three admirals in seven days—Admiral
Raeder and Admiral Saalwächter, who
coordinated operations in the Atlantic,
and Admiral Carls, who was responsible
for naval operations in the North and
Norwegian Seas. Neither country’s navy
executed its respective intentions per-
fectly, but postoperational analysis indi-
cates that the British had at least learned
their World War I lessons better. They
also then applied the lessons of Opera-
tion RHINE more effectively to their
post-1941 operations.
Both books provide an insightful, bal-
anced, and fascinatingly fresh treatment
of a well reported naval event, and they
complement each other well. In addition
to the revelations discussed above, both
expose design and equipment problems
that reduced Bismarck’s readiness and
combat effectiveness, but Loss of the Bis-
marck does better with the faults of Brit-
ish ship designs. Both show how ULTRA
contributed indirectly to Bismarck’s de-
struction, but once again Rhys-Jones ap-
plies the naval context better; more
importantly, he presents the German
intelligence picture, highlighting the
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impact of Germany’s failure to integrate
its intelligence. However, Rhys-Jones all
but ignores America’s involvement and
fails to include much of the German ma-
terials that detail the political factors
driving Admiral Raeder and explain the
naval staff’s objections to executing Op-
eration RHINE in May 1941. Neither
book tells the story completely; but if
one must choose, The Loss of the Bis-
marck provides a better naval story,
while The Destruction of the Bismarck
provides the better strategic treatment.
CARL O. SCHUSTER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Kailua, Hawaii
Strachan, Hew. The First World War: To Arms.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. 1,127pp.
$39.95
What began as a single-volume replace-
ment of Oxford University Press’s
long-running World War I survey (A
History of the Great War, by C. R. M. F.
Cruttwell [1934]) has, in Hew Strachan’s
hands, burgeoned into three mammoth
volumes, of which this is the first. The
second, we are told, will cover the years
1915 and 1916 and will be called No
Quarter. The third and final volume, en-
titled Fall Out (reader be warned that the
first volume has been in the making
since 1989), will pick up in the winter of
1916 and push through to the end of the
war.
Since this first volume alone runs to
1,127 pages, readers will want to know
how this book differs from an already
crowded field. The answer is that it looks
at topics—origins, war planning, tactics,
munitions crises, morale—in a broad
comparative context. No blundering
great power is unfairly singled out.
As is obvious from the subtitle, the
book is about the origins of the war,
mobilization, and opening campaigns.
To rephrase what has already been writ-
ten many times over by battalions of
historians is no easy task, but Strachan
rises to the challenge. Better yet, he
works through all the latest literature
in English, French, and German to pro-
vide the most up-to-date interpretation
of the war’s outbreak. In common with
most historians, Strachan points to the
shakiness of the German Empire and its
nervous quest for status and security as
the main causes of the war. A chief
abettor was Austria-Hungary, whose
own military had become so enfeebled
by the continuous Vienna-Budapest
budget skirmishes that war in 1914 ap-
peared the only way to rally the monar-
chy behind a much-needed program of
rearmament. Similar calculations pre-
vailed in Russia, where the tsar hoped
that mobilization in defense of Serbia
would heal political wounds and stop a
politico-economic strike wave that had
escalated from 222 strikes in 1910 to
3,534 in the first half of 1914. France
and Great Britain appear more benign;
Strachan concludes from the most re-
cent French scholarship that there was
no real war fever in France—révanche
was a slogan of certain pressure groups.
Britain was hamstrung between its fleet
and “continentalists” clustered around
General Henry Wilson.
Strachan’s analysis of the competing war
plans is excellent. Regarding the
Schlieffen Plan, he describes Moltke the
Younger’s growing unease with the
seven-to-one ratio set by Albert von
Schlieffen to overweight the “right
hook” through Belgium and Holland
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